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The "information explosion" has reached atomic, if not even
graver, proportions: books, magazines, television, and radio pour out
a constant stream of information on a near infinity of subjects. New
,technologies-microfilm, cassettes, Xerox, and long-distance trans-
mission systems-unlock old sources and expand accessibility. Much
of this information, both quantitatively greater and easier of access,
is not of an enduring, or even honest, .order: political oratory and
cheap diatribes reach larger audiences than ever, despite what ap-
pears to be a deterioration in information that was even before of
poor quality.
Surely few have in recent years been as concerned with the content
of information and its dissemination as the securities industry and its
regulators. Increasingly, shareholders, would-be investors and securi-
ties industry professionals, as well as the public in general, have been
offered an almost embarrassing abundance of information concern-
ing publicly-held securities and securities about to be publicly-held.
While the quantity of information has increased perhaps geometri-
cally, there has been a continuing concern with quality-a concern
expressed constantly, and sometimes, when sanctions are imposed,
dramatically, by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
various securities exchanges-and with dissemination, the extent to
which the information gets into hands where it can do some good.
At the moment the debate is urgent concerning what investors should
be told, the manner in which they should be told, and the shortcom-
ings of previous disclosure techniques. Increased emphasis is placed
upon meaningful, comprehensible and available information for the
shareholder, the investor and the professional.'
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1. See generally SEC Securities Act Release No. 5276 (July 26, 1972), reprinted in CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP., special ed. no. 434 (1972); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5278 (July 26,
1972). reprinted in CCH 1972 FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 78,888; SEC Securities Act Release No.
5279 (July 26, 1972), reprinted in CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., special ed. no. 434 (1972).
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATION IS USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
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STATE LAWS AND INFORMATION TO SHAREHOLDERS
Despite the mounting demand for disclosure to persons whose
capital finances enterprises, state laws are still, as they have always
been, singularly deficient in affording shareholders and investors
effective means of learning about the operations of the companies in
which they have invested or may wish to invest. One commentator
in 1964 said:
There are virtually no requirements that a company not listed on an exchange
send even an annual report to its stockholders. A recent check of the corpora-
tion laws of all fifty states ind the District of Columbia reveals that twenty-
two states have corporate reporting requirements of one type or another. Of
these, in only fourteen states are the reports available to shareholders, and in
three the requirement may be dispensed with by including a contrary stipula-
tion in the by-laws. Specific requirements of content for reports are generally
nonexistent, and only two states require certification by a public accountant.
In no state is there any requirement dealing with proxy solicitation or allowing
a state agency to exercise control over the form or content of proxy material.2
Virtually all states require the filing of annual reports with the
Secretary of State or some other state authority, generally in connec-
tion with franchise tax matters, 3 but for the most part these files are
not available to the public. In the five states (California, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Connecticut and Michigan) which require that reports
be sent to shareholders,' and in those states which require that corpo-
rations furnish reports to shareholders upon request, the require-
ments are generally regarded as ancillary to the almost uniformly
given right to examine corporate records.' Professor Cary has, in
something of an understatement, characterized the information re-
quired to be given shareholders under the typical corporation statute
as of a "somewhat meagre character."6 In some instances, state blue
sky laws require the filing of reports as long as a registration under
the state law is effective, but again, no provision requires that this
information be furnished to shareholders or to the state on a continu-
ing basis.7
2. Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 625 (1964).
3. 2 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 126, 1 2, Comment (2d ed. 1971).
4. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3006 (West 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-334 (Supp. 1972);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.45 (1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.72 (1951); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1318 (1967).
5. 2 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AT ANN. § 52, 2, Comment (2d ed. 1971).
6. W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1029 (4th ed. 1969).
7. 2 Loss 824; 5 Loss 2791-92 (Supp. 1969).
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THE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE SCHEME
As has happened frequently, the deficiencies of state law, in this
case, securities law, led to federal action to meet an evident social
need. Thus, after some twenty-two years of experience with state
legislation, an experience that indicated an unevenness and grave
inadequacy of efforts to protect the investing public, the federal gov-
ernment in 1933 entered the field of express securities regulation.
The persistent thrust of the federal securities regulation scheme
,has been disclosure-in the words of former President Franklin D.
Roosevelt when proposing the first broad-scale federal legislation on
the subject in 1933: "put[ting] the burden of telling the whole truth
on the seller."' The prevalence of this philosophy is reflected in Pro-
fessor Loss's often-quoted statement: "Then too, there is the recur-
rent theme throughout these statutes of disclosure, again, disclosure,
and still more disclosure."9
The first federal venture into disclosure was the Securities Act of
193310 which was directed principally to disclosure in connection with
significant offerings by issuers and those persons controlling such
issuers. As an administrative tool, Congress included in this legisla-
tion section 17(a)" which forbade half-truths, fraudulent devices,
schemes and artifices, misstatements, and other fraud-like conduct in
connection with the sale of securities. Apart from the remedies re-
lated to the registration process, a civil remedy was also provided for
misstatements of material facts made in connection with the sale of
securities, or omissions of material facts necessary to make the state-
ments made not misleading.'2
In 1934 Congress followed these innovations with the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,'1 which sought, among many other things,
to establish a system of continuous disclosure, but only for companies
with securities registered on an exchange. In 1936 Congress some-
what awkwardly extended the continuous reporting requirements to
most companies which registered securities under the 1933 Act by
requiring in such registration statements an undertaking to file re-
ports equivalent to those required of listed companies.' 4 It was only
8. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1933).
9. I Loss 21.
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970).
II. Id. § 77q(a).
12. Id. § 771(2).
13. Id. § 78a et seq.
14. 2 Loss 818.
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in 1964, when the "section 12(g) company" category of issuer-a
company which had, initially 750, later 500, holders of a class of
equity securities and one million dollars of assets-was created that
continuous reporting was mandated for substantial over-the-counter
companies regardless of undertakings.' 5
The concept of disclosure was also expressed in section 14(a) of
the 1934 Act,"6 which gave the SEC broad rule-making power in
connection with proxy solicitations. Under the rule-making authority
of section 14(a), the SEC gradually developed the now familiar proxy
statement containing extended disclosures of certain particulars, de-
pending on the nature of the action sought from shareholders. In
1964 Congress broadened these disclosure requirements by giving the
SEC authority to require compliance with the proxy rules by section
12(g) issuers and required similar disclosures by listed companies and
section 12(g) companies which for one reason or another chose not
to solicit proxies for their annual meetings.'8
Unlike the Securities Act of 1933 which specifically prescribes
delivery of disclosure documents in specified circumstances to mem-
bers of the public, 9 the periodic reporting requirements of the 1934
Act contain no such requirement."0 While efforts have been made to
facilitate the availability of this information in SEC files, in general
these filing requirements have resulted in the accumulation of vast
and usually unused information concerning American business. How-
ever, there is general agreement"' that requiring such filings has had
a beneficial impact on the integrity of corporate disclosures which do
receive wider public circulation-for example, press releases and an-
nual reports-and does often sift information into the market place
through analysts and other experts who dig it out of SEC files. Re-
cently, the process has been assisted by the availability of these peri-
odic reports on "microfiche" which are microfilm copies mounted on
easily stored cards available at a relatively low price. 22
15. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
16. Id. § 78n(a).
17. The requirements for proxy statements are specified in schedule 14A under the 1934
Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1972).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
19. Id. § 77f(d).
20. See id. § 78m. The proxy rules, of course, forbid proxy solicitations unless a proper
proxy statement is used, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1972), and, since 1964, require certain disclo-
sures if no proxies are solicited. Id. § 240.14c-2.
21. I Loss 349.
22. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS 313-18 (1969) (The Wheat Report).
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The federal system began with emphasis upon disclosure in
connection with distributions-substantial sales by issuers and their
controlling persons. Presumably this approach was the consequence
of testimony in the Congressional hearings following the 1929 debacle
which dramatized the wrongs that had occurred in connection with
the distribution of new issues .2 The 1934 Act shifted the emphasis
somewhat by addressing itself to continuous reporting for listed com-
panies. Despite this effort to construct a continuous reporting system,
.the orientation of the bar and financial community continued toward
the 1933 Act disclosure in connection with distributions. Conse-
quently, the quality of such disclosure was higher than in the 1934
Act reports; 1933 Act prospectuses received wider distribution than
1934 Act reports; and the SEC staff studied with far greater intensity
and commented with far greater rigor upon the 1933 Act filings.2 1
Yet, the trading market continued to grow, with far more dollars
committed in it than in distributions.? Although there had been ear-
lier efforts to attract attention to the shortcomings of disclosure in
the trading market, the superb essay by Milton Cohen2 1 sounded the
tocsin most pointedly and urged a truly integrated system of disclo-
sure that recognized the extent of the trading market and the some-
what hit-and-miss manner in which regulated information reached it.
THE ANNUAL REPORT
While the disclosure documents mandated by the 1934 Act re-
main for the most part in SEC files, and reach the public only indi-
rectly through ambitious analysts and diligent researchers, one dis-
closure document has been increasingly recognized as communicating
effectively with shareholders and the investment community in gen-
eral: the annual report to shareholders.
The annual report has not always been viewed as a means of
communicating significant information. In a 1902 annual report a
publicly-held company candidly informed its shareholders that "[t]he
settled plan of the directors has been to withhold all information from
stockholders and others that is not called for by the stockholders in
a body. So far no request for information has been made in the
23. See generally R. DEBEDTS, THE NEw DEAL'S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS (1964). See
also S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
24. See SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, supra note 22, at 392-95; Cohen, "Truth in
Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1353-54 (1966).
25. See SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, supra note 22, app. II-1.
26. Cohen, supra note 24.
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manner prescribed by the directors . *..."2 One wonders at the
extent of our progress after nearly four decades of effort to improve
corporate communications when a responsible writer comments,
"[m]anagement seems to have forgotten that its first obligation to
investors is to tell them what the company is, what it is trying to do,
what it has accomplished, and where it has failed." 8
It is generally conceded that the issuer's annual report to share-
holders is currently the most widely circulated and used disclosure
document. Professor Loss has remarked in his Comment on section
601 of the proposed Federal Securities Code that the proposal therein
giving direct authority to the SEC to regulate in some measure the
contents of annual reports is based "on the theory that the annual
report, more than the occasional prospectus or even the proxy state-
ment, should be recognized as the central device for continuous dis-
closure. 29
To some extent this contention has been statistically confirmed in
a study which surveyed analysts and nonprofessional shareholders.'"
The group of analysts who were surveyed indicated that the annual
report was the written document that meant most to them .3 Further,
the nonprofessional shareholders indicated that six out of ten spent
more than five minutes with annual reports received and a third
indicated that they spent fifteen minutes or more.32 The time spent
by such persons on the disclosure documents under the 1934 Act
would, of course, be very close to zero.
Indicative of the extent to which management uses the annual
report to communicate to many audiences, not just to its sharehold-
ers, is the fact that typically companies print two or three times as
many copies of annual reports as they have shareholders. Not only
is the annual report used by companies for communicating with its
shareholders and the investment community, but
the annual report is used regularly for such purposes as recruiting employees,
27. Jones, Management Freedom in Annual Reports, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, Aug., 1971,
at 23.
28. Hobgood, Segmented Disclosure in 1970 Annual Reports, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE,
Aug., 1971, at 18, 22.
29. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 601, Comment 2, at 119 (Tent. Draft No. I, 1972).
30. See NEw TRENDS IN ANNUAL REPORT READERSHIP 23 (1971).
31. Not surprisingly, the analysts thought that form 10-K was the second most important
written document and that both the annual report and form 10-K were markedly exceeded in
value by management and analysts' meetings. Id.
32. Id. at 24.
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selling products and services, attracting acquisitions, and, increasingly, as a
"corporate calling card" when dealing with foreign businessmen.3
The annual report is the darling of management since "they
[management] have primary control over it (unlike prospectuses,
often written by lawyers),' 34 and it is not unknown for a skillfully
prepared annual report to raise a company's price-earnings ratio.3 5
However, these benefits are not cheaply accomplished. American
Telephone & Telegraph, for example, is reported to spend $575,000
for simply printing and designing its annual report, plus additional
expenses in mailing.36
Typically, the annual report will contain the following:
1. The cover. Generally, this will be colorful and may or may not
have some identifiable relationship to the company.
2. Financial highlights. Either in a very brief table or through bar
charts and graphs, or both, the company's recent financial history
will be summarized, similar to the method the SEC has mandated for
the presentation of use of proceeds and dilution in prospectuses.37
3. The president's letter to shareholders. This has been described
as the last remaining opportunity for uncensored communication
from the chief executive officer to his shareholders.
4. A description of the business of the company, often accompa-
nied by arresting pictures related to the company's operations.
5. The financial statements. These include balance sheets, income
statements, surplus statements, and source and application of funds
statements, together with the auditor's certificate.
6. Usually the report will contain other useful information, such
as the identity of officers and directors and the names of general
counsel,3" transfer agents and registrars.
Apart from whether the annual reports comply with technical
legal requirements, many analysts have criticized them for a variety
of reasons: "Many annual reports are creating serious credibility
problems because they lack candor, are overtechnical or are just
33. GRAPHIs ANNUAL REPORTS 11 (1971).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id.
37. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5278 (July 26, 1972), reprinted in CCH 1972 FED.
SEc. L. REP. 1 78,888.
38. Inclusion in the annual report of the name of general counsel may pose awkward-
problems, as for instance, exposure to liability. See Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F.




considered nothing more than promotional puffery."39 Analysts have
criticized the interpretations placed by management on events during
the year, and they resent the frequency with which they receive
"everything's all right" reports which shove the dirty problems of the
company and its industry under the pretty pictures. 4 There is, in
short, a broad band of dissatisfaction among analysts with respect to
the contents of the annual report.
A HISTORY OF THE SEC AND THE ANNUAL REPORT
Despite the clear evidence of the importance of the annual report
as the means by which information is communicated on a regular
basis to a company's shareholders, to the investment community, and
to the trading markets, the SEC has been remarkably circumspect
and cautious in moving to improve the quality of the annual report.
This hesitancy probably has its origin in two circumstances. First,
nowhere in any of the securities statutes administered by the SEC,
except in the cases of regulated issuers, is it given a clear mandate or
power to control the content and uses of the annual report.4 It has
clear and express authority to govern the contents and uses of pros-
pectuses and other written communications used in connection with
distributions;4 2 it has clear authority to regulate the contents of peri-
odic reports filed with the SEC;4 3 it has clear power to make rules
with respect to the solicitation of proxies, including the contents of
proxy statements.44 But nowhere is the SEC accorded unimpeachable
power to direct the contents and use of annual reports: "Apart from
the Holding Company and Investment Company Acts, the SEC can-
not directly regulate the reports sent to shareholders as distinct from
those filed under the several statutes. ' 45
The second retarding circumstance is probably sensitivity to
charges that too great an intrusion into the annual report may in-
fringe upon the constitutional assurance of free speech. This concern
was undoubtedly accentuated by the failure of Congress to give the
SEC clear authority to regulate the contents of annual reports.
As discussed below, it was not until 1942 that the SEC took its
39. NEW TRENDS IN ANNUAL REPORT READERSHIP I (1971).
40. See id. at 9-1I.
41. See I Loss 348.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j, 77s (1970).
43. Id. §§ 78m, 78o(d).
44. Id. § 78n(a).
45. I Loss 348.
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first diffident step in the direction of regulating the annual report. 6
It was a relatively small step, especially when contrasted with the first
step it had proposed to take.
SEC Proposals for Direct Regulation of Annual Reports
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gave the SEC broad power
to make rules and regulations with respect to the solicitation of prox-
ies, consents and authorizations pertaining to any security (other than
an exempted security) registered on a national securities exchange.
This enactment stemmed from an increased concern with "sharehold-
ers democracy," based upon evidence elicited in Congressional hear-
ings that there had been a gross disregard of shareholders' rights.,'
The SEC first exercised its power under this section in 1937.11 The
rules adopted then, described by Professor Loss as "rudimentary in
comparison with today's rules,"4 required moderate disclosure of
matters to be acted upon by shareholders and prohibited the making
of any materially false or misleading statements in connection with
the proxy solicitation. In 1938 the SEC amended its rules to require,
for the first time, that shareholders receive a "proxy statement" with
specified contents."
Sweeping changes in the proxy rules were proposed by the SEC
in 1942.11 Among other changes, it proposed that the proxy statement
contain information concerning the business activities of the issuer
and its subsidiaries during the preceding fiscal year, including a de-
scription of changes in the character of the business; a description of
changes in the issuer's charter; information concerning significant
acquisitions and dispositions; actions taken with respect to compen-
sation; information concerning changes in indentures and other in-
struments affecting the rights of security holders; and information
concerning grants of options and the operation of bonus and other
types of plans.
The SEC provided that this requirement could be satisfied
through the medium of the annual report. Most importantly, the
proposed amendments included the annual report within the defini-
46. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 15, 1942).
47. 2 Loss 858-59; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934); S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 74-76 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
48. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1350 (Aug. 13, 1937).
49. 2 Loss 869.
50. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1823 (Aug. I1, 1938).
51. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 15, 1942).
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tion of "proxy soliciting material" which would have to be filed with
the SEC at least ten days before such materials were mailed to share-
holders. Thus, the contents of the annual report would have become
subject to the potential liabilities flowing from section 18 of the 1934
Act 52 and pre-use review by the SEC.
This proposal resulted in protest from issuers. Fifteen years later,
the Chairman of the SEC, J. Sinclair Armstrong, described what
occurred:
Many companies complained at that time [1942] that if the annual report to
shareholders must be "filed" with the Commission and therefore subjected to
civil liability provisions of section 18, the effect would be to place severe
limitations upon the freedom of communication and comment to shareholders
concerning corporate affairs. The Commission at that time believed that it
would be in the public interest to encourage, rather than limit, the dissemina-
tion of information to security holders and that if fear of civil suits might have
an adverse effect in this respect, it might be better to require delivery of the
report but to free it from the provisions of section 18. 3
In response to these protests the SEC excluded the annual report
from the scope of "proxy soliciting materials" and instead adopted
the procedure which is preserved in substance today: an annual report
had to precede or accompany the proxy statement sent to sharehold-
ers by management, and it had to contain such financial statements
for the last fiscal year of the issuer as would, in the opinion of man-
agement, adequately reflect the position and operations of the is-
suer.54 Copies of the report had to be sent to the SEC no later than
the first date upon which they were mailed to shareholders.5
Thus, there was to be no requirement of prior clearance with the
SEC, as in the case of proxy statements, before the annual reports
were sent to the shareholders; the reports were not to be deemed
"filed" for purposes of section 18, a fact confirmed quite explicitly
by the Director of the Corporation Finance Division of the SEC in
1943; 51 and annual reports remained essentially free of attack under
the federal securities laws, for the implications of rule lOb-5, 7
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970). Section 18 has always been a "toothless tiger," for recoveries
under this section have been few. E. GADSBY, THE FEDERAL SECURITIEs EXCHANGE Acr OF
1934 (pt. I) § 5.02, at 5-4 (1971).
53. Hearings on Stock Market Study Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency,
84th Cong., Ist Sess. 1556 (1955).
54. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 15, 1942).
55. Id.
56. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3380 (Feb. 5, 1943).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
1102 [Vol. 1972:1093
ANNUAL REPORT
adopted in 1942, had not yet been discerned by the most vigilant
administrator or imaginative plaintiff's counsel.
During the course of hearings on the SEC's amended proxy
rules, 8 the rule adopted by the SEC concerning the furnishing of
annual reports to shareholders was discussed by Chairman Ganson
Purcell before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce. In response to the obvious confusion of the congressmen with
respect to form 10-K (the annual report filed with the SEC and
exchanges) and the annual report to shareholders, he said:
The principal difference, if there is a difference-and there usually is-between
the annual report to stockholders and the report to the exchanges and to the
Commission is that the annual report to stockholders is more discursive,
chatty. It makes more interesting reading, as it should, to the stockholders
than would ordinarily be the case of materials submitted on formal documents
to the Commission.59
It was evident from the dialogue with the members of the Com-
mittee that they were not bothered by the consequences under section
18 if the annual report were required to be "filed" with the SEC.
They interrogated Chairman Purcell with respect to the SEC's power
to require such filing, and he indicated a belief that the SEC had
broad enough power to require such "filing."60
The requirements adopted by the SEC in 1942, that annual re-
ports be sent to each shareholder in connection with the solicitation
of proxies, created only minimal additional obligations for issuers.
The only issuers subject to the proxy rules in 1942 were those listed
on exchanges, and as Mr. Purcell acknowledged to the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, virtually all, if not all,
exchanges required that annual reports with specified information be
sent to shareholders.6 Chairman Purcell also acknowledged that the
only purpose of the requirement that the reports be sent to the SEC
was to permit monitoring of compliance with the requirement that
they be mailed to shareholders."
Prior to the 1942 amendments to the proxy rules, the SEC, recog-
nizing the apparent absence of direct power over annual reports,
58. See generally Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 (SEC Proxy Rules)
Before the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1
(1943).
59. Id. at 20.
60. Id. at 23.
61. Id. at 21.
62. Id. at 20.
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sought such power from Congress. In 1941 it proposed that section
17 of the 1933 Act be amended to make it "unlawful for any issuer,
by use of the mails or interstate commerce, to send to its stockholders
a report containing any statement which is false or misleading with
respect to a material fact. '6 3 According to Professor Loss, the secur-
ities industry would have gone along with this proposal provided that
the defense essentially contained in section 18 of the 1934 Act-good
faith and reasonable ground to believe-were incorporated in the
provision.64 It is interesting to note that at the time of this proposal
the general belief was that section 17 of the 1933 Act provided the
basis only for SEC administrative action and criminal action, and it
was not contemplated that section 17 afforded anyone a private rem-
edy; only in the following year did rule lOb-5 make its appearance,"
and it was another four years before a court determined that rule lOb-
5, with its similarity to section 17, afforded a private remedy; 6 and
only many years later did a court conclude that section 17 also pro-
vided a private remedy. 7 As will be discussed below, to a large extent
rule 1Ob-5, as extended in so remarkable a fashion by the courts, has
provided a network of potential liabilities around the annual reports
that goes further than the amendment proposed in 1941' would have
gone.
Indirect Methods for Regulating Annual Reports
In 1954 still seeking to accomplish indirectly what it had recoiled
from doing directly in 1942, the SEC amended form 10-K to require
that if a registrant distributed an annual report to shareholders, a
copy of the report should be furnished to the SEC not later than the
date it was mailed to shareholders, and that if no such report was
furnished to shareholders, then the SEC should be so told in the
form.68 Since issuers of listed securities were already required to fur-
nish to shareholders and file with the SEC annual reports, 9 this new
63. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 7TH CONG., IST
SESS., REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 at 23 (Comm. Print. 1941).
64. 2 Loss 1029-30 n.652.
65. 3 Loss 1761.
66. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also 3 Loss
1763 n.261.
67. Pfeiffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Osborne v. Mallory, 86
F. Supp. 869, 878-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also 6 Loss 3813-14 (Supp. 1969).
68. SEC Release U-159 (1954). See also I Loss 349.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
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requirement affected only issuers required to file reports with the
SEC as the consequence of section 15(d) of the 1934 Act 7T-that is,
companies which had a registration statement effective under the
1933 Act and which continued thereafter to meet certain require-
ments, but were not registered under the 1934 Act. Again, the annual
reports were not to be considered as "filed" for purposes of section
18 liability. In 1965 with the extension of the proxy rules to unlisted
companies covered by section 12(g) of the 1934 Act, form 10-K was
amended to expressly limit this requirement to companies required
to file reports with the SEC by section 15(d) of the 1934 Act.7
The hesitancy of the SEC to deal directly with the contents of the
annual report has continued. In 1972 it proposed that issuers be
required to identify in form 10-K those portions of the form not
included in the annual report, 72 presumably thereby enhancing the
capacity of the SEC staff to determine the extent of an issuer's candor
with its shareholders, with possible administrative action as the con-
sequence. This provision, in turn, would make issuers think twice
before omitting significant information from the annual report, and
would warn any person relying on the annual report that the whole
story of the company may not be contained in the report. The Chair-
man of the SEC has made a parallel suggestion that the annual report
contain identification of the portions of form 10-K not included,
thereby presumably touching off curiosity on the part of the share-
holders concerning the information denied them.
Role of Annual Reports in Federal Securities Regulations
The annual report to shareholders plays other roles in the scheme
of federal securities regulation. First, in a number of instances finan-
cial statements in the annual report to shareholders may be incorpo-
rated by reference in official filings with the SEC; of course, when
they are so incorporated, they become "filed" and potentially the
subject of liability under section 18 of the 1934 Act. The general
prerequisite for such use is that the information incorporated be in
substantial conformance with the financial reporting requirements of
the SEC.73
70. The exchanges had for some time required that annual reports be furnished to share-
holders. The Commission's powers with respect to proxy statements prior to 1964 were confined
to listed companies. Id. § 78o(d).
71. 4 Loss 2387 (Supp. 1969).
72. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9576 (Apr. 20, 1972), reprinted in [1971-
1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,727.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-23(c) (1972).
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Schedule 14A details the required contents of proxy statements
under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and specifies that certain financial
statements are material information and must be included in proxy
statements soliciting proxies with respect to the authorization or issu-
ance of a material amount of senior securities or the authorization
or issuance of common stock in an exchange, merger, consolidation,
acquisition or similar transaction.74 These requirements can be satis-
fied with financial statements in the annual report to shareholders if
it is "sent to security holders pursuant to § 240.14a-3 (Rule X-14A-
3) with respect to the same meeting as that to which the proxy state-
ment relates, provided such financial statements substantially meet
the requirements of this item."7 5
Rule 12b-2376 under the 1934 Act provides a broad license for
incorporation by reference of information in annual reports in filings
with the SEC. It states that any information other than financial
statements contained in an annual report "may be incorporated by
reference in answer or partial answer to any item of a registration
statement [under the 1934 Act] or report [principally forms 8-K, 10-
Q and 10-K]." Financial statements contained in an annual report to
shareholders may be incorporated by reference in a registration state-
ment or report provided that "such financial statement substantially
meets the requirements of the form on which the statement or report
is filed."
Accounting Series Release No. 4111 particularizes "substantial
conformance" and indicates the variances from SEC financial state,
ment requirements which would not preclude the use of statements
in the annual report. In a number of instances-for example, the
grouping of a number of items-the requirements of regulation S-X11
are more exacting than those required by generally accepted auditing
and accounting principles.
The SEC has relied heavily on the annual report with respect to
form S-8. This form is available to issuers required to file reports with
74. Id. § 240.14a-101, item 15(c).
75. Id. § 240.14a-101, item 15(d).
76. Id. § 240.12b-23.
77. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 41 (Dec. 22, 1942), reprinted in 4 CCH FEu. SEC.
L. REP. 1 72,059 (1964).
78. The stringent standards of general regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1972), as to the
grouping of items on the balance sheets and income statements of "commercial and industrial
companies" are set out in 17 C.F.R. 210.5-02 to -03 (1972).
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the SEC under either section 1311 or section 15(d) ° of the 1934 Act
for securities to be offered to the issuer's employees, or employees
of a subsidiary, pursuant to a stock purchase, savings or similar plan.
Item 25(a) of form S-8 requires the inclusion of certain financial
statements in the registration statement. If the annual report of the
issuer contains certified statements substantially conforming to those
required in item 25(a), then they may be incorporated by reference
in the registration statement. To insure that these incorporated-by-
reference statements meet the eyes of the offerees, undertaking B(a)
of this form requires the issuer to deliver with the prospectus a copy
of its annual report for its most recent fiscal year unless the employee
as a shareholder of the issuer otherwise receives such a report. Fur-
thermore, undertaking B(b) requires that annual reports and other
mailings to shareholders also be provided to participants under the
plan with respect to which securities are registered unless they are
shareholders and therefore otherwise receive reports.
THE ANNUAL REPORT IN COURT
The failure of the SEC to include the annual report among "fil-
ings" subject to section 18 or section 14 liability has not constituted
a license to management to play fast and loose with truth in the
annual report. As is the case in many areas of securities law, rule lOb-
5 has filled the gap and, if anything, provided more serious danger
of liability than would have been present had the express liability
provisions of the statutory scheme been applicable.
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co."' and Heit v. Weitzen12 the
Second Circuit clearly established that for a rule lOb-5 violation to
exist it was not necessary that the defendant have engaged in securi-
ties transactions; rather, the requirement that the misconduct be "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security" was satisfied if
the purchaser or seller of securities was the victim of a stated wrong
even though the wrongdoer was not in the market. In Heit v. Weitzen
the application of rule lob-5 to the annual report was expressly
stated.83 In that case the management of the issuer caused annual
reports containing false information to be issued to its shareholders
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
80. Id. § 78o(d).
81. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
82. 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
83. 402 F.2d at 913.
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and circulated through the investment community. The purpose of
circulating such false information was to conceal from the govern-
ment information which might have adversely affected the issuer's
defense contracting business. The Second Circuit held that a cause
of action was stated by one who had allegedly purchased in the mar-
ket on the basis of the information in the annual report.84
A somewhat different basis of liability was found in Butler A via-
tion International, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc.85 The plain-
tiff in that case charged that the defendant corporation had engaged
in various violations of federal securities laws in connection with a
tender offer for the stock of the plaintiff. One of the charges was that
the defendant's annual report constituted a part of the tender offer
and that, in violation of section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, the report
contained a material omission, namely, failure to disclose that the
statement that the earnings during the final quarter of the fiscal year
exceeded those of the preceding quarter was based solely on a change
in accounting method. Section 14(e) prohibits in connection with
tender offers substantially the same conduct forbidden by rule lOb-5
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The court held
for the plaintiff on this and other grounds and stated that it did not
have to reach the question of standing under rule lOb-5. 6
A case which posed an interesting question was Dillon v. Berg,87
in which it was alleged that the defendants, who were officers and
directors of a corporation, caused the corporation to mail annual
reports to new shareholders without correcting information in the
report vhich had become false. The court held that the failure to
correct an annual report or update it could not give rise to liability
under rule 14a-9,88 which forbids the use of misleading statements or
omissions in connection with proxy solicitations, but that if there
were to be liability for any such failure it would have to be found
within the terms of rule 14a-3.19 Although the court concluded there
was no basis for liability under rule 14a-3, it expressly recognized that
annual reports were not "filed" for purposes of section 18 and based
its conclusion with respect to possible liability deriving from the fals-
84. Id.
85. 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
86. Id. at 843 n.I.
87. 326 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971), aff'd, 453 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1972).
88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1972).
89. Id. § 240.14a-3.
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ity of the annual report on rule lOb-5Y°
The question of the extent to which monetary liability as distin-
guished from injunctive relief may flow from a misleading annual
report is a confused and complex one. Judge Henry J. Friendly,
apparently expressing the opinion of a majority of the Second Circuit
sitting en bane in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, 91"expressed concern
about awarding damages as the consequence of simple negligence in
corporate reporting.9 2 In Heit v. Weitzen,9 3 Judge Harold Medina
stated that the question did not have to be resolved given the state of
the pleadings in that case since the pleadings appeared to charge some
degree of scienter. While this somewhat conservative view with re-
spect to monetary liability appears to prevail in the Second Circuit,
the Tenth Circuit in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 4 stated that
there may be such liability if a defendant fails to sustain the burden
of proving that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of the misrepresentation or omission.
This opinion appears to be dictum since the lower court found for the
plaintiffs on the basis that "the record here discloses that the press
release issued by defendants was misleading, intentionally deceptive,
inaccurate and knowingly deficient in material facts."95 Monetary
liability would extend to anyone who participated in the violation or
who controlled the issuer.
Other cases have confirmed the applicability of rule lOb-5 to
annual reports. In Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co. 6 the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois held that a cause of action was
stated against accountants when it was alleged that they had negli-
gently prepared financial statements appearing in an annual report.
Similarly, in Fischer v. Kletz a7 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York determined that a cause of action was stated
both under common law and rule lOb-5 when it was alleged that
auditors who learned after their certification had been published in
an issuer's annual report that the financial statements in the report
which they had certified were false, failed to disclose in an appropri-
90. 326 F. Supp. at 1231 n.27.
91. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
92. Id. at 866 (concurring opinion).
93. 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
94. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
95. 309 F. Supp. 548, 563-64 (D. Utah 1970) (emphasis added).
96. 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. III. 1967).
97. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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ate manner such subsequently acquired knowledge.
THE PRESENT SEC RULES
Rule 14a-391 as it presently stands requires that if a solicitation is
made on behalf of management and relates to the annual meeting at
which directors are to be elected, each proxy statement furnished, if
the issuer is subject to the proxy rules, must be accompanied or
preceded by an annual report. This annual report must contain the
following and have the following characteristics:
I. It must include in comparative columnar form such financial
statements for the last two fiscal years, prepared on a consistent
basis, as will in the opinion of management adequately reflect the
financial position of the issuer at the end of each year and the results
of operations for each such year. Consolidated financial statements
of the issuer and its subsidiaries must be included in the report if they
are necessary to reflect adequately the financial position and results
of operations of the issuer and its subsidiaries, but in such case, the
individual statements of the issuer may be omitted even though they
are required to be included in reports to the SEC. The SEC may
permit the omission of the statement for the earlier of the two years
when good cause is shown.
2. Any difference reflected in the financial statements included in
the annual report from the principles of consolidation or other ac-
counting principles or practices, or methods of applying accounting
principles or practices, applicable to the financial statements of the
issuer filed or proposed to be filed with the SEC (form 10-K) which
would have a material effect upon the financial position or results of
operations of the issuer must be noted in the annual report and the
effect reconciled or explained. However, the financial statements and
the report may omit details and employ condensation to the extent
deemed suitable by management, with the caveat that "such state-
ments, considered as a whole in the light of other information con-
tained in the report, shall not by such procedure omit any material
information necessary to a fair presentation or to make the financial
statements not misleading under the circumstances.""
3. The financial statements for at least the most recent fiscal year
must be certified unless those statements in form 10-K are not re-
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1972).
99. Id. § 240.14a-3(b)(2).
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quired to be certified or the SEC finds that certification would be
impracticable or involve undue effort or expense.
4. The rule then states that "[s]ubject to the foregoing require-
ments with respect to financial statements, the annual report to secu-
rity holders may be in any form deemed suitable by the manage-
ment."' 00
5. If the issuer has not previously submitted to the security hold-
ers an annual report pursuant to the rule, then the report must con-
tain such information concerning the business done by the issuer and
its subsidiaries during the fiscal year as will, in the opinion of man-
agement, indicate the general nature and scope of the business of the
issuer and of subsidiaries. When it was first proposed in 1964 that a
description be included in the annual report, it was urged that it be
in each annual report.'0' The final rule required such a description
only for one year.
6. An annual report need not precede or accompany a proxy
solicitation by management if a solicitation is being made in opposi-
tion to management and management's proxy statement includes an
undertaking to furnish the annual report to all p6rsons being solicited
at least twenty days before the meeting. This provision was obviously
intended to avoid disadvantaging issuers against whom proxy con-
tests were mounted by precluding their responding to some extent
because the annual report was not available.
7. Seven copies of the annual report must be sent to the SEC
"solely for its information" not later than the date on which the
report is first sent or given to security holders or the date on which
preliminary copies of solicitation material are filed with the SEC,
whichever date is later. The rule specifically states that
[tihe annual report is not deemed to be 'soliciting material' or to be 'filed'
with the Commission or subject to this regulation otherwise than as provided
in this rule, or to the liabilities of Section 18 of the Act, except to the extent
that the issuer specifically requests that it be treated as a part of the proxy
soliciting material or incorporates it in the proxy statement by reference. 02
Apparently, the annual report is rarely incorporated into the proxy
statement by reference.0 3
100. Id. § 240.14a-3(b)(4).
101. SEC Securities Act Release No. 7447 (Oct. 21, 1964), reprinted in [1964-1966 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,142. Under the original 1942 proposal both the annual
report and a proxy statement would have had to be "filed" and a description of the business
had to be included. See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1972).
103. 2 Loss 887.
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In 1964 Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
inter alia, to provide in section 14(c)0 4 that if an issuer subject to the
SEC proxy rules did not solicit proxies, it had to furnish to its share-
holders, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the SEC
might adopt, information "substantially equivalent" to that which
would be furnished in a proxy statement. The SEC has adopted rules
under this section' which virtually parrot the proxy rules, including
rule 14a-3.'' Thus, even if a corporation does not solicit proxies, it
has the obligation to furnish annual reports to shareholders and to
the SEC to the same extent as if it did solicit proxies.
The development of rule 14a-3"07 since its first appearance in 1942
has almost entirely been the consequence of the emergence of specific
abuses, rather than the consequence of an effort to develop a coordi-
nated system of disclosure. Specifically, the requirement of consoli-
dated financial statements had its origin in the Atlantic Research
Corp. case. 08 Atlantic Research had a subsidiary which had incurred
substantial research and development costs resulting in a large loss,
a loss which, if reflected in consolidated financial statements, wiped
out the profits of the parent and other affiliated companies. The rule
applicable to form 10-K required that in these circumstances consoli-
dated financial statements be incorporated in the filing with the SEC,
These consolidated financial statements indicated that the enterprise
as a whole had lost money during the most recent fiscal year. How-
ever, in the financial statements included in the annual report to
shareholders, only the parent's income statement, which showed a
substantial profit, was included. As a result of this case, subpara-
graph (2) of rule 14a-3 was inserted, requiring that variations between
financial statements in annual reports and filings with the SEC be
noted and reconciled or explained.' Again, it should be noted how
cautiously the SEC dealt with the problem. Rather than mandating
that the financial statements contained in the annual report should
be prepared consistently with those contained in form 10-K with
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1970).
105. 17 C.F.R. 240.14c-3 to -7 (1972).
106. See notes 98-102 supra and accompanying text.
107. Whenever reference is made to rule 14a-3, the remarks are equally applicable to rule
14c-3.
108. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4657 (Dec. 6, 1963), reprinted in [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 9 76,949.
109. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7324 (May 26, 1964), reprinted in [1961-
1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 76,999.
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specified exceptions, the SEC simply required that variations had to
be disclosed and reconciled.
Generally, since the adoption of this requirement, the financial
statements in annual reports have been virtually identical with those
filed with the SEC. However, as noted by commentators, there are a
number of variations that are permissible:
These may include some relatively small degree of condensation . . . . They
may also include certain cost and expense classification differences on the part
of a few companies which, because of Rules 14a-3 and 14c-3, disclose the
differences and reconcile the two reports [with respect to variations in stating
cost of goods sold, depreciation, depletion and amortization, etc.]. Further, the
SEC does not object to the omission of certain technical or compliance disclo-
sures required by S-X that are usually omitted in the financial statements
contained in stockholders' reports on the grounds that they are not essential
to a fair presentation of the statements. Generally these technical or compli-
ance disclosures are considered to include [certain items] most of which con-
cern footnotes . .. .11
In one area to which the requirements of rule 14a-3(a)(2) do not
extend, disparities between reports filed with the SEC and the infor-
mation contained in annual reports has been noted. In 1969, after
extensive discussion, the SEC adopted amendments to forms S-1, S-
7 and 10,"'1 which were extended to form 10-K in 1970.112 These
amendments required that any registrant having more than one line
of business include as a part of its "description of business," and not
as a part of its financial statements, information concerning the sales
and profits of each "line of business" which met certain size tests. The
determination of what constituted a "line of business" was left largely
to management's judgment guided by certain very broad tests."'
A recent study" 4 compared the "line of business" reporting prac-
tices of 84 multi-line companies in forms 10-K and in the correspond-
110. H. KELLOGG & M. POLOWAY, ACCOUNTANT'S SEC PRACTICE MANUAL 721 (1971).
Ill. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8650 (July 14, 1969), reprinted in [1969-
1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,729.
112. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9000 (Oct. 21, 1970), reprinted in [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,919.
113. See form 10-K, item 1(c)(1), reprinted in CCH 1972 FED. SEC. L. REP. 31,103, at
22,053. See also Sommer, Experience in Line of Business Reporting, in THIRD ANNUAL INSTI-
TUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 163, 164-65 (Mundheim & Fleischer eds. 1972); SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 4988 (July 14, 1969), reprinted in [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 77,729.
114. 10-K and the Annual Report: How One Hundred Leading Corporations Report Sales




ing annual reports. Of these companies, 36 gave identical breakdowns
of sales and earnings; two gave breakdowns in the annual report
which were not the same as those in form 10-K; 18 gave sales, but
no earnings, breakdowns. Of these companies, 10 were identical with
the form 10-K breakdowns and eight were substantially different.
Twenty-eight gave no breakdowns whatsoever in the annual report.
Among 16 single-line companies, required in form 10-K to set forth
sales of classes of products or services if they reached certain levels
of importance, which had reported sales broken down by classes of
product or service in their forms 10-K, three gave the same break-
downs in the annual report, two gave different breakdowns, and 11
gave no breakdown whatsoever.
If such "line of business" and product or service class information
were part of the financial statements covered by rule 14a-3, regula-
tion S-X, and the financial statement requirements of form 10-K, a
reconciliation and explanation would be required in the annual report
with no doubt more and better information going to shareholders.
There is presently discussion among accountants concerning the fea-
sibility of including such information in the audited financial state-
ments.115 It should be noted that although there remain serious dis-
crepancies in this area of reporting, the situation has been steadily
improving." 6
Another way in which the SEC has sought to regulate annual
reports indirectly is the requirement that a prospectus disclose
whether or not annual reports will be furnished to security holders
and whether they will contain certified statements."' The manner in
which the SEC has sought to upgrade annual reports indirectly is seen
even more clearly in its release discussing a registrant which issued
its annual report for 1967 while a registration statement under the
1933 Act was pending with the SEC."8 In the statistical information
in the front of the annual report, the company compared 1967 sales
and earnings, which included a significant acquisition made in a
"pooling" during the year, with 1966 results "as reported," rather
115. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, DISCLOSURES OF
SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION (1967); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, OUTLINE OF POSSIBLE OPINION (1967).
116. Hobgood, supra note 28, at 28.
117. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), reprinted in 11967-1969 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. J1 77,636.
118. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9010 (Nov. 19, 1970), reprinted In
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,929.
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than as restated to reflect the pooling in 1967 (the certified income
statement for 1966 was restated). The SEC concluded that this re-
porting was misleading."'
As a result of its determination, the SEC did not bring an injunc-
tive action under rule lOb-5 or section 17(a). Rather, it resorted to a
device which has often been criticized:2 ° it refused to accelerate the
effectiveness of the 1933 Act registration statement. Although this is
not reflected in the release, it also pressured the registrant to send an
amended annual report to its shareholders.
Although an SEC sponsored study121 concludes that "only in a
small minority of cases can it be said that the disclosures in present-
day annual reports are seriously misleading, .... ,,2 it nonetheless
recited instances in which disclosure in annual reports departed
markedly from reasonable standards of fair presentation. 23 The
study considered requiring by rule that all financial disclosures in the
annual report to shareholders, wherever located in the report, be
reviewed by the issuer's auditors for consistency with the certified
financial statements and covered by their opinion. 124 However, the
study appeared to opt for a somewhat different approach, namely, a
rule that would prohibit any chart, schedule, highlights section, and
so on, in the annual report from presenting the results of operations
or other material information in a light more or less favorable than
the financial statements included in the annual report or any prior
reports.2 5 The study's recommendation has not been implemented.
THE ANNUAL REPORT AND CODIFICATION
Because of the hesitancy of the SEC to assert direct control over
the contents of annual reports, the granting of this power in unmis-
takable terms has been for Professor Loss one of the major desiderata
of the American Law Institute Codification Project which he heads.
119. It also faulted the company for setting forth two earnings per share figures, one based
on common shares and "residual securities" and the other on average common outstanding
during the year. The SEC stated that when a company had residual securities outstanding, it
should not include in its report an earnings figure based only on common shares actually
outstanding.
120. See Mulford, "Acceleration" Under the Securities Act of 1933-A Reply to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 14 Bus. LAW. 156 (1958).
121. SEC, DiSCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, supra note 22.
122. Id. at 368.
123. Id. at 368-71.
124. Id. at 372.
125. Id. app. XI-I.
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In his first report to the membership of the American Law Institute
on the project, Professor Loss said:
Another basic idea which might be developed is to give the Commission direct
jurisdiction over the annual report to stockholders. That, after all, is the
document that gets to people, much more so than the occasional prospectus.
We know that today it's the proxy statement that has become the really
valuable disclosure device, not the prospectus. The Commission has backed
into the stockholders' report by having it submitted to the Commission, al-
though it's not technically filed, more or less as an appendage to the proxy
statement. But why not make the stockholders' report central? Why should we
have a system in which the Commission regulates what goes into an occasional
prospectus but cannot say what goes into the stockholders' report, so that,
subject to the fraud provisions, companies can say what they like in the stock-
holders' report even though it's perhaps different from what they have just said
in an annual report filed with the SEC?
In short, while diminishing the impact of the prospectus, we might maxim-
ize the impact of more effective devices-the proxy statement, the report to
stockholders." 6
In Tentative Draft No. 1 of the proposed code," 7 which was ap-
proved by the membership of ALI in May, 1972, Professor Loss and
his counsellors and advisors have implemented this intent. Section
601 of this draft of the code would provide:
(a) [Commission's authority] A registrant shall
(1) file,
(2) send to every record holder of its securities other than commercial
paper,
(3) keep for whatever periods the Commission prescribes by rule, and
(4) publish (through press releases or otherwise) whatever annual reports
(with financial statements), quarterly reports, and other reports the Commis-
sion requires by rule to keep reasonably current the information and docu-
ments contained in the registration statement or to keep investors reasonably
informed with respect to the registrant.
(b) [Optional material] A report may contain material that is not required.
(c) [Time of filing] A report required to be filed shall be filed at whatever time
the Commission specifies by rule, except that it may not require that optional
material sent to security holders or published be filed before it is sent or
published.
In comparison, the draft originally submitted to the Council of
the ALI simply provided that a registrant would file "at whatever
126. Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW,
27, 33-34 (1969).
127. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972), contains the portions of the proposed




time (which may be in advance of use) the Commission requires by
rule, whatever annual reports" and other reports the Commission
would require by rule "to keep reasonably current the information
. ..in the registration statement or to disclose material changes with
respect to the registrant."'' 18 This earlier version, which would have
permitted the SEC to control the entire contents of the annual report
and require the filing of the entire report before use, met with objec-
tions from some members of the Council because, as Professor Loss
stated in the Comment in Tentative Draft No. 1, they were apprehen-
sive that it "might be both impracticable, because of the mass of
reports that the staff would have to examine in the early months of
each calendar year, and self-defeating, because of the danger that
reports to stockholders would become as lengthy and complex as
many prospectuses."' 2 1 Perhaps there was also the concern that the
president's last chance at uncensored communication with sharehold-
ers might be lost.
Professor Loss, however, in his Comment in Tentative Draft No.
I, reiterates the importance of the annual report:
However, it is central to the philosophy that has marked the planning and
discussion of the Code thus far that the concept of the annual report to stock-
holders as the central device for continual disclosure should be adopted unequi-
vocally. It is that assumption more than anything else that justifies needed
relaxation in what is now the Securities Act registration area. 30
Section 601 in the version approved by the membership of the
ALI seeks to preserve the centrality of the annual report and quiet
the fears of the Council and others. The SEC under the approved
section could prescribe information which must be included in all
reports to shareholders, including the annual report, and compel the
filing before use of those portions prescribed with the SEC. Neverthe-
less, the right of management to speak without prior clearance in
whatever manner it wished, subject only to anti-fraud considerations,
is preserved by permitting the inclusion of non-required information
and material which does not have to be filed in advance with the SEC.
Professor Loss remarks that perhaps cautious managements will
want to file in advance even the optional portions and that whether
this will be feasible will depend upon the willingness and resources
of the SEC. '3
128. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 601-1 (Council Draft No. 1, 1972).
129. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 601, Comment 2(d), at 120 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 121.
1117Vol. 1972:10931
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
When the proposed code will be adopted has been the subject of
varying estimates. Professor Loss is hopeful that it will be finally
approved by the American Law Institute in 1975;32 how long from
this date to legislative enactment is anyone's guess, and the time
thereafter for implementation by the SEC is equally uncertain. Thus,
it appears to be at least half a decade before the new approaches to
securities regulation embodied in the code become an operative real-
ity.
THE ANNUAL REPORT AND RULE-MAKING
Since it will be several years before the code will be enacted, what
should be done in the meantime? In a number of instances, goals of
the codification effort are being achieved in substantial measure
through rule-making and other means available to the SEC. For
example, as a consequence of the SEC's Disclosure Study' 3 much
progress has been made in integrating the disclosure requirements of
the 1933 and the 1934 Acts. Pending enactment of the code, should,
or can, steps be taken to make the annual report a more reliable
document?
As discussed above, the SEC has moved cautiously in the annual
report area. It has been suggested, however, that perhaps the SEC
has more power than it acknowledges. One commentator has said:
The way to do a real job for disclosure to the investing public is the improve-
ment of the information in the annual report. I don't have a doubt that the
Commission would have the power to force that improvement. It has already
gone a long way in that direction through Rule 14a-3.111
Further, as noted earlier, the SEC itself believes that it has the power
to compel the pre-use filing of the annual report with consequent
liability under section 18 of the 1934 Act, and it would appear that
this belief, at least in 1943, would extend to the power to control the
contents of the annual report.
Two of the principal tools available to the SEC would be further
rule-making under the 1934 Act and a step-up of enforcement pro-
ceedings when confronted with misleading annual reports, accompa-
nied perhaps by greater scrutiny of annual reports when they are
submitted to the SEC.
132. Id. at xvii.
133. SEC, DiSCLOSURE TO INvEsTORS, supra note 22.
134. Address by Professor Homer Kripke, Securities Regulation-The Myth of the In-
formed Layman, New York State Bar Association, Jan. 27, 1972.
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The SEC is given extremely broad rule-making power in connec-
tion with proxy solicitations, power which is broad enough to require
the pre-use filing of materials proposed to be used in such solicita-
tions. Under section 14(c) that power is broadened to require the
communication of previously cleared information to shareholders
even when no proxies are solicited. Under this power, the SEC has
established its present regulation of the annual report. Is there any
reason why the SEC could not go much further than it has? Surely,
it is no exaggeration to suggest that any report to shareholders, no
matter when sent to them, is a proxy solicitation, even if it does not
occur within the formal period of four or six weeks prior to the
shareholders' meeting. Former SEC Commissioner Byron D. Wood-
side has stated the argument in this manner:
The treatment of the annual report of the corporation under the proxy rules
is an interesting example of administrative dexterity. I can think of nothing
more likely to persuade stockholders that management should be retained in
office than an annual report containing all the indicia of existing and continu-
ing success. As so viewed, it would seem odd not to conclude that the report,
sent with a request for a proxy, was not part of the soliciting material, if not
in fact, the most effective inducement to mail a proxy to management. As so
viewed, the report would be subject to the proxy rules and it would be "filed"
with the Commission as proxy material.13'
Some precedent for this notion is afforded by Butler Aviation Inter-
national, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc.,' in which the court
found that communications well in advance of the formal commence-
ment of a tender offer were in fact a part of the tender offer and hence
subject to the regulation under the 1934 Act.
Once it is determined that the annual report is part of the proxy
solicitation materials, it would seem that the codification goal of a
two-part annual report, one pre-use part cleared with the SEC, the
other "free writing," could be readily accomplished. The SEC could
make mandatory certain contents-financial statements, description
of important changes in the business during the past year, informa-
tion concerning conflicts of interest and the like. After all, the SEC
has taken significant leaps in requiring use of annual reports and to
some extent prescribing the contents of financial statements therein,
and it could require, as it once proposed to do, that portions be filed
135. Woodside, Development of S.E.C. Practices in Processing Registration Statements
and Proxy Statements, 24 Bus. LAW. 375, 385-86 (1969).
136. 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
1119Vol. 1972:1093]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
in advance with the SEC and be deemed "filed" for the purposes of
section 14 and section 18 of the 1934 Act.
There is little doubt that the SEC could require in proxy soliciting
materials financial statements and the kind of information found in
annual reports-bar charts, graphs, discussion of recent develop-
ments, and description of the business done during the past year. If
this is true, and if the annual report to shareholders may properly be
considered as a part of the soliciting process, where is the block to
the accomplishment of more reliable disclosure in the annual report
to shareholders?
It may be that the mandatory upgrading of a portion of the report
would have salutary effects on the remainder. With one portion of
the annual report containing "hard" information (and perhaps, given
the new approach of the SEC, "soft" information-projections,
budgets, appraisals-as well)137 cleared with the SEC, the report
would probably inhibit somewhat the free-wheeling and often mis-
leading propensities of some presidents' letters and highlights sec-
tions.
Another disclosure approach would be reliance upon rule lOb-5.
Given the broad construction of the language "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" by the Second Circuit,'38 the possi-
bility of promulgating rules under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act gov-
erning the annual report should not be overlooked. This section gives
broad power to the SEC to adopt rules "necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or the protection of investors" to bar manipulative
or deceptive devices or contrivances. While the SEC has, with the
exception of rule 10b-5, used its power under this rule rather conser-
vatively and only with respect to fairly particular types of deception
or manipulation, the willingness of the courts evidenced in rule lOb-
5 cases to give the SEC's power a broad reading would suggest that
an effort to control the contents of annual reports under this section
would not be ill-favored by the courts.
A somewhat different approach which could be taken is greater
enforcement activity under rule lOb-5. In an injunctive proceeding by
the SEC under rule lOb-5, there is little or no requirement of scien-
ter;131 thus the SEC would have to prove only the fact of violation,
137. See. e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5276 (July 26, 1972), reprinted in CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP., special ed. no. 434 (1972).
138. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1968). See
also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
139. I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 8.4, at 203 (1971).
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and not the state of mind of the perpetrators. Such SEC actions
almost invariably breed class actions by those allegedly harmed by
the misconduct; hence a few well-chosen SEC actions directed toward
faulty annual reports, followed by the inevitable private litigation,
would go far to inhibit looseness with truth in annual reports.
Assuming that the SEC could under its present powers compel the
pre-use review of portions of the annual report by the SEC staff, and
assuming that the SEC could require that annual reports contain
specified information, what would be accomplished? As mentioned
before, the annual report has wide circulation in the investment com-
munity; generally the proxy statement has little circulation beyond
the family of shareholders, and the filings wim the SEC have virtually
none. If information presently contained in the proxy statement-for
example, officers' compensation and transactions with insiders-
were required to be included in the annual report, the information
would be more broadly circulated, and hence, would have the po-
tential of affecting management conduct more significantly than is
true today. Furthermore, a requirement with respect to the descrip-
tion of the business akin to that suggested in 1943, coupled with an
opportunity for the SEC to review the material in advance of use,
could significantly reduce the complaint of analysts and others about
the "pollyanna" aspects of annual reports.
If the SEC has power to require pre-use filing and review of the
entire annual report, then surely it would have power to require this
with respect to only part of it. Given the limits of manpower and
finances, this is the course the SEC would probably prefer. Thus, as
provided in the proposed code, the opportunity would remain for
presidential free writing, but obviously, this opportunity would be
disciplined by the awareness that other parts of the report had been
processed through the SEC staff.
Is a requirement that certain information be included in the an-
nual report and that such information be reviewed by the SEC staff
before use too heavy or exacting a burden for corporations? Does
making such information "filed" for purposes of sections 14(a) and
18 of the 1934 Act create excessive risks of liability? In 1942 industry
protested the proposal for pre-use filing and the potential of liability
under section 18. Thirty years have passed. While in many contexts
concern for liability is, if anything, more real than ever, there is
perhaps less concern about this notion, as evidenced by the relatively
limited objection of the ALI Council to some pre-use review of an-
nual reports by the SEC and the acceptance of the two-part annual
report by the membership of the ALI.
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There has been a growth in the integrity of annual reports and in
the convictions of corporate executives that the ultimate good of their
corporations is best served by meaningful and accurate disclosure to
the financial market place. Thus, the adoption of a proposal for pre-
use review by the SEC and mandatory incorporation of certain infor-
mation in the annual report would result in a far less dramatic up-
grading of annual reports than would have occurred had the SEC's
proposal in 1942 been adopted. Finally, section 18, with its elaborate
defenses, is recognized as less a danger than it was earlier. 4 How-
ever, since Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 4' section 14(a) has been
recognized as a significant potential source of liability. Notwithstand-
ing these fears, good reason exists to believe that, given the concern
with meaningful and reliable corporate disclosure, the sensitivity of
the securities markets, and the vastly increased participation, directly
and indirectly, of the public in the markets, the annual report, the
principal medium of disclosure, should be made a more reliable docu-
ment, and the most immediate means of accomplishing this is
through greater regulation of its contents.
Would a requirement that portions of the annual report be filed
in advance for clearance by the SEC place upon an already over-
worked staff additional demands that would prove unbearable? This
would depend largely upon the extent to which the SEC carries
through its avowed intent of reallocating resources in the direction
of more careful scrutiny of continuous disclosure documents, with
corresponding de-emphasis upon sometimes excessive scrutiny of fil-
ings under the 1933 Act. If this intent is followed, the burden would
be tolerable, particularly if Congress recognizes the constructive im-
port of such a procedure with adequate appropriations.
Obviously, making the annual report read like a prospectus
should be avoided; consequently, any rules adopted to accomplish the
suggestions in this article should preserve clearly the opportunity of
the management to speak in a "discursive, chatty" fashion to its
shareholders. A skillfully drafted rule should not interfere with that
opportunity, while affording to investors an assurance of improved
annual report quality.
140. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1968);
Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 220-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); E. GADSBY (pt. I), supra note 52,
§ 5.02, at 5-4; Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-JOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for De-
frauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1129 (1950); cf. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783, 788 (2d Cir. 1951).




It is axiomatic that the annual report is the most effective instru-
ment presently available for continuous disclosure. It is likewise axio-
matic that the quality of disclosure in the annual report falls far short
of that customary in 1933 Act registration statements and prospec-
tuses and in the 1934 Act filings with the SEC, which are generally
believed to be inferior to 1933 Act filings. The SEC has used its rule-
making power under sections 14(a) and 14(c) with hesitancy and
circumspection to eliminate or hamper gross abuses in the use of
annual reports when they appear, but it has been hesitant to assert
the power to make the annual report a consistently credible docu-
ment. It is suggested in this article that greater enforcement effort
directed to annual reports under rule lOb-5, and a greater willingness
by the SEC to push to the limits of the power given it by sections
10(b), 14(a), and 14(c), would go far to achieve the degree of control
sought through the codification proposal of the ALI, giving direct
power over annual reports to the SEC.
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